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inAmerican Health Law
By M. Gregg Bloche
Professor Bloche's work on tiis article
was supported in part by an Investigator
Award in Health Policy Research from
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
uring the 1960s and 1970s, the individual rights revolution that swept
through American society remade
much of the nation's health law in its
image. Sick people acquired the right to be
told of the risks and benefits of proposed
treatments and then to give thumbs-up or
thumbs-down to their doctors' decisions.
Successful suits for medical negligence
went from rare to commonplace. Elderly
and poor Americans achieved statutory
rights of access to publicly funded healthcare, and courts burnished these rights
with myriad procedural protections. The
critically ill and their families won the right
to refuse aggressive, life-sustaining treatments. Psychiatric patients acquired new
veto power over hospital confinement and
drug therapy, and biomedical research
subjects gained myriad safeguards grounded in the principle of informed consent.
By the early 1980s, the law governing
American medicine embodied, in form if
not in practice, the ideal of the individual as author of his or her own clinical
fate. This ideal portrayed patients as sovereign clinical consumers, entitled to
make decisions about their care without
regard for the financial consequences
borne by others. So long as the assorted
others-mainly employer-sponsored
health insurance plans and taxpayersupported federal and state programs-
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paid more or less uncomplainingly, this
ideal seemed immune to challenge. It
appealed, diversely, to liberal proponents of the individual rights revolution
and to conservatives inclined toward
pursuit of efficiency through deference
to consumer choice. It disregarded the
fact that consumers of healthcare often
do not pay for what they choose.
Today, the paradigm of personal
choice in medical matters is under assault
from several directions. Pressed by taxpayers and cost-sensitive employers, public
and private healthcare payers no longer
finance individual choice uncomplainingly. Medicare, Medicaid, and employersponsored health plans pursue
management strategies designed to discourage high-cost consumer choices. Subscribers to HMOs and other managed care
plans face an array of financial incentives,
bureaucratic barriers, and contractual limitations that constrain access to treatment
options, alternative providers, and information about risks and benefits. Federal
preemption of state tort and contract law
applicable to employer-provided health
benefits shields many of these constraints
against legal challenge. Tort reform proposals pending in a number of states
would reduce the scope of healthcare
providers' potential liability for failure to
obtain informed consent, and proposed
changes in state mental health law would
diminish the ability of patients with
impaired judgment to refuse hospital confinement and treatment.
More surprisingly, perhaps, skepticism
about the primacy of individual rights in
the medical sphere has grown among

advocates for the health of the disadvantaged. In response to mounting epidemiological evidence that personal health is
more closely tied to social status, income
level, race, education, and environmental
exposure than to per capita medical
spending, some advocates for the disadvantaged have questioned the wisdom of
public spending on healthcare programs
that aspire to emulate the individual
choice enjoyed by well-insured, fee-forservice patients. Balanced against the benefits of spending on education, economic
development, and other health-promoting
public programs, the benefits of achieving
1970s ideals of personal choice in medical
programs for the poor seem, to them,
worth forgoing. Tightly-managed HMOs
and other prepaid plans, some suggest,
may achieve more on the health promotion front ( e.g., through systematic marnmography and blood pressure screening,
physical fitness, and health education programs) than classic fee-for-service coverage, while providing almost the same
therapeutic benefits, at lower cost. Beneficiaries lose a measure of personal freedom
when they become ill, but this loss is more
than made up by directing the savings to
more cost-effective social programs.
This line of thinking is also gaining support abroad. Advocates of an international
human right to health increasingly stress
the socioeconomic determinants of health,
including education, income, social peace,
and respect for civil and political rights.
India, South Africa, and other "third world"
democracies are experimenting with the
HMO model as a means of making comprehensive, basic medical care available to
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the poor at a feasible cost. Sacrificing a
measure of personal choice to universalize
access to basic health services has much
appeal, as a matter of equity, in impoverished societies where rudimentary medical
care is unavailable to millions.
These misgivings about the priority of
personal choice in health policy fit awkwardly with the priority of patient autonomy in American health law and in the
growing body of international ethical
and legal norms bearing upon personal
rights in the medical setting. Put simply,
American law, international codes of
medical ethics, and such legal sources
as the Nuremberg Tribunal, European
and other regional human rights commissions, and the Uniled Nations reflect
the principle that sick patients should be
told the risks and benefits of clinical
alternatives and then be allowed to
make their own choices from among
them. To the extent that managed health
plans and assorted efficiency-oriented

trade-off strategies, relying instead on
opaque promises to cover "medically necessary" care. To their credit, health plans
have become more lucid in their descriptions of preauthorization requirements, innetwork/out-of-network coverage
differentials, and the like. But they usually
disclose little about their clinical decision
protocols, financial incentives to providers
to limit care, and other management practices that shape sick subscribers' options.
Moreover, most employers offer only
one or a few subsidized group plans,
leaving employees with the "choice"
between these and the often prohibitive
cost of purchasing Unsubsidized individual insurance. Employers that do not offer
health benefits leave their workers with
only the latter option. Likewise, public
programs for the poor, principally Medicaid in the United States, typically offer
few, if any, options when they channel
beneficiaries to managed care plans.
"Third world" experiments with HMOs

medial nedis ineffiient
health promotion programs pursue savings by foreclosing alternatives (and/or
by denying patients information about
them), such programs challenge governing ideals of patient autonomy.
Proponents of the managed care revolution in the United States have sought to
finesse this dilemma by construing the act
of subscribing to a managed health plan
as anticipatory consent-giving (before the
onset of medical need) to the plan's bundie of choice-reducing policies. This strategy seeks to rescue the paradigm of
personal autonomy by relocating disclosure and consent from the bedside to the
employee benefits office, or wherever else
people sign up for health plans. Its proponents contend that this approach respects
autonomy by allowing consumers to bring
their diverse personal preferences to bear
on choices between health plans with different economizing policies.
This assumes that competing health
plans explain their distinctive cost-benefit
trade-off policies (and constraints on
patient choice) to consumers and that
consumers have access to a diverse range
of plans. The reality of today's medical
marketplace falls far short in this regard. In
their promotional campaigns and contracts with subscribers, health plans typically reveal little about their cost-benefit
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for the poor, in India and elsewhere, have
tended to suffer from the same defect.
Some of managed care's more exuberant defenders dismiss these concerns,
claiming that plan disclosures about their
cost-benefit trade-off policies are adequate, that employers offering only one
or a few subsidized plans act as employee purchasing agents (and thereby give
surrogate consent) when selecting from
among many alternatives, and that constraints on choice in Medicaid and other
public programs are legitimated by collective, political consent. Others favorably inclined toward the managed care
model take these concerns seriously but
insist that markets can adequately
address them. They urge health plan
managers to reveal more about their costbenefit trade-off policies, and they advise
employee benefits managers and administrators of government programs to insist
on such disclosure and to offer wider
menus of alternative plans.
Government action holds out the potential to spur such change. Courts and regulators could tie the acceptability of limits on
clinical alternatives more closely to the clarity and specificity of health plan disclosures
to subscribers about their cost-benefit tradeoff policies. In the current political environment, federal intervention to require

employers to offer diverse menus of health
plans is unlikely, but tax and other incentives for voluntary expansion of employees'
health plan options are a possibility, and
health coverage purchasing cooperatives
could extend such choice to small businesses and independent subscribers. Political
support for broadening the coverage
options available to Medicaid managed
care subscribers is problematic, but advocates for the disadvantaged might do better
to focus on this objective (and on the need
for sufficient subsidies to "mainstream"
Medicaid beneficiaries into plans with
many working class subscribers) than to
oppose managed care for the poor outright.
Yet, such developments can at best
reduce, not eliminate, the tension
between the 1960s and 1970s ideals of
individual autonomy embodied in
American health law and 1990s thinking
about efficient allocation of resources to
maximize the health of populations. The
paradigm of informed consent to medical intervention that lies at the core of
American health law privileges a sick
patient's preferences at the moment of
medical decision over his or her economizing preferences at the time of health
plan enrollment-and over achieving
the biggest "bang for the buck" when
devoting social resources to health.
From a population-oriented perspective, this is plainly inefficient. Indeed,
growing evidence suggests that much of
our response to individual medical need
is inefficient, in aggregate health terms,
when compared to equivalent spending
on education and job training, environmental protection, and other health-related social needs. Yet, we are hardly ready,
as a society, to ignore individual clinical
need, or to give up our empathy and ethical regard for the fears, distress, and hopes
of the sick when medical decisions loom.
To the contrary, most of us would not
want to live in a society that required us
always to disregard our private worries
and emotional ties in deference to the
greatest good for the greatest number. In
the years ahead, Amerkan health law will
need to mediate this central tension,
between our intimate and public selves,
between compassion and calculation,
and between rights and efficiency.
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